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Reuter: On Mootess: NYS Rifle Pistol Assoc. v. NYC

NOTE
ON MOOTNESS:
THE NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION
V. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Thomas Reuter*
The principles of limited government, separation of powers, and
federalism have become ubiquitous colloquialisms echoed in the halls of
legislatures, courts, and research institutions. Despite preconceived notions,
these principles are not partisan. Their application may be debated, but their
importance is not denied. This Note examines the limits of the Supreme Court
of the United States as established in Article III of the United States
Constitution. Specifically, it defines the standards of justiciability and
examines one element: mootness. The Note looks at a 2013 New York City
case regarding Second Amendment rights: The New York State Rifle Pistol
Association v. The City of New York, New York. The Supreme Court of the
United States had not heard a major gun rights case in almost 10 years (the
last being landmark cases District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and
McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010)). While the Court granted certiorari in
January of 2019, it faced a significant obstacle: the controversy’s resolution.
Given the resolved grievances, the Supreme Court of the United States had
to consider whether or not it held the requisite jurisdiction to examine the
merits of the case. This Note will begin with a discussion on the purpose and
limitations of the Judiciary. This discussion will be followed by a history of
the case and the grievances sustained by the petitioners. Thirdly, the Note
will define mootness and apply the doctrine to the facts of this case.
Importantly, the Note also examines the exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
when a case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” as established in
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com.. Finally, the
Note acknowledges varying jurisprudential philosophies but emphasizes the
Court’s uniform commitment to and understanding of the standards of
justiciability, specifically mootness. Political Philosopher Leo Strauss once
wrote, “good writing achieves its end if the reader considers carefully the
‘logographic necessity’ of every part, however small or seemingly
*
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insignificant, of the writing.” Considering the United States Constitution to
be a piece of “good writing,” the text must be scrutinized, analyzed,
understood and applied. The text of the Constitution grants the Judiciary
jurisdiction over “controversies” for which, the Note argues, there remains
none in The New York State Rifle Pistol Association v. The City of New York,
New York.
I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 9
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE: AMENDED LAWS AND PROVISIONS AFFECTING
THE CONTROVERSY.................................................................................. 10
III. THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY...........11
A. Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine..................................... 12
B. Precedence for Assigning Mootness to Cases Experiencing
Amendments to Laws in Question Post-Certiorari......................13
C. Mootness Irrespective of Intentions........................................15
IV. JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE..........16
V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 17
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial power of the United States, vested in one Supreme Court,
extends to “all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution,” as
well as “Controversies.”26 The U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to define
justiciable standards as cases and controversies. By doing so, the Court places
a meaningful restriction on its judicial power. The Court does not opine what
the law ought to be, does not comment on legislative shortcomings or
inaccuracies, and does not act in an advisory capacity. Rather, the Court
chooses to define the law through the cases and controversies that arise under
its jurisdiction. When a case or controversy is justiciable, it is relevant and
appropriate enough to be heard by the Court. However, the Court has also
defined what is non-justiciable. Justices determine justiciability by looking at
whether a case or controversy is ripe, moot, if the petitioners have standing,
and if the issue is a political question. If the Court finds that a case does not
meet a satisfactory threshold for any one of these four criteria, the case is
found to be non-justiciable and must be dismissed. This Note will solely
examine mootness in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. The
City of New York. The mootness doctrine is a judicial procedure limiting the
U.S. Supreme Court to only deciding live controversies: controversies
capable of being redressed with a favorable decision. In New York State Rifle
& Pistol Association, Inc. v. The City of New York, an issue initially arose
26

See U. S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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over the constitutionality of a New York law regulating the transportation of
firearms. The petitioners, Romolo Colantone, Efrain Alvarez, and Jose
Anthony Irizarry, challenged a portion of a New York City law regarding a
“premise license” which hindered their ability to freely transport their
firearms to, specifically, a second house as well as to shooting ranges outside
of New York City.27 In June of 2019, the City adopted amendments to the
New York City law around premise licenses, resolving both of the grievances
experienced by the petitioner.28 New York State also repealed the restrictions
placed on the petitioners in this case.29 This Note will document the history
of New York City laws, explain the mootness doctrine and why its
application is necessary, and provide information about the previous
jurisprudential opinions of Justices. Pursuant to precedents, the Constitution,
and the change in law, a case or controversy no longer exists in this case. In
order to maintain strict fidelity to stare decisis, it is imperative that the U.S.
Supreme Court find this case moot and provide instructions for the case to be
remanded to a lower court with directions to dismiss.
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE: AMENDED LAWS AND PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE
CONTROVERSY

The initial controversy stemmed from a provision within the New York
City licensing scheme. Within New York City, there are two types of licenses
available to gun owners: a premise license and a carry license. A “carry
license” is issued in rare circumstances when an individual can demonstrate
that “proper cause exists.”30 A “premise license,” the license at issue in this
case, allows an individual to keep their firearm in the residence to which the
firearm was licensed and may not remove the firearm from that address unless
to “maintain proficiency in the use of the handgun” at an authorized shooting
range or to transport the firearm to an authorized area for hunting.31 Under
the initial City of New York rule 5-23, the shooting range must be within the
City of New York.32 The three plaintiffs all held a premise license, however,
they wished to “transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions
outside New York City” and, one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Colantone, wished to
transport his firearm from his house in New York City to a second house
27

See 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-01(a), New York State statute, NEW YORK PENAL LAW §
400.00(2)(a), (b) (Consol. 2019).
28
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1043(f)(1)(c)., App. 9a–10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(5), (6)).,
App. 10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-22(a)(16))., App. 8a–9a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3)).
29
See App. 14a (N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(6)).
30
See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 400.00(2)(a), (f).
31
See 38 RCNY § 5-23(a).
32
See id.
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upstate.33 Barred from doing either of these things under the city law, the
plaintiffs filed suit in the Southern District of New York claiming that the
law’s restrictions on the transportations of their guns infringed upon their
Second Amendment rights, their First Amendment right of expressive
association, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the fundamental right to
travel.34 The District Court dismissed the complaint and, on appeal, the 2nd
Circuit Appellate Court affirmed. Since then, New York City has amended
its regulations, and New York State passed a law that now allows for the
transportation of licensed handguns to shooting ranges outside of municipal
borders and to a second home.35 Given that the petitioners are no longer
hindered by the law, the case no longer qualifies as an Article III case or
controversy; thus, the case should be found moot and the merits of the case
need not be examined by the Court.
III. THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Mootness implies that there has been some kind of a change in the case
(i.e. time or a change in law), thus the issue or controversy at hand has passed
and there is nothing to decide. Fundamental to the understanding of Mootness
is DeFunis v. Odegaard.36 Mario DeFunis was rejected from the University
of Washington Law School despite having the requisite test scores and grades
for admission.37 Specifically, DeFunis held higher LSAT scores than other
minorities who were granted admission.38 A trial court’s decision to order the
public school to admit him was overturned by the Washington Supreme
Court.39 Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
Notably, the University of Washington Law School ended up admitting
DeFunis and he had “registered ‘for his final quarter in law school,’”40 when
the U.S. Supreme Court was preparing to hear the case. Since DeFunis was
set to complete his final year at UW Law School, and his issue had been
remedied, the controversy between the parties was no longer "definite and
concrete"41 and no longer "touch[ed] the legal relations of parties having
33

See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, Docket No. 15-638-cv
(2018).
34
See id.
35
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1043(f)(1)(c)., App. 9a–10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(5), (6)).,
App. 10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-22(a)(16))., App. 8a–9a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3)).
36
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
37
DeFunis v. Odegaard, op. cit., at 329.
38
Id, at 321.
39
Id, at 335-6.
40
Id, at 315-6.
41
Id, at 317.
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adverse legal interests."42 Since there was no more existing case or
controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the case non-justiciable and
moot.
The Federal Courts do not act in an advisory capacity, nor can they decide
cases simply because there is “great public interest in the continuing issues
raised by [the] appeal.”43 Rather, North Carolina v. Rice,44 referencing Oil
Workers Unions v. Missouri,45 says “federal courts are without power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them.”46 Returning to New York Rifle & Pistol Association v. The City of New
York, there were two grievances: the law prohibited persons with a premise
license to transport their handgun to a second residence outside of New York
City and it prohibited the transportation of a premise-licensed handgun to a
shooting club outside of New York City.47 In June, those laws were
reversed.48 The petitioners now have the ability to transport their handguns
to second homes outside of the borders of New York City and they are able
to transport their guns to shooting clubs outside of New York City. Since the
petitioners’ complaints have been remedied given the change in law, the
litigants are no longer affected by the outcome of the case and so the case
should be deemed moot.
A. Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine
Now, there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine; most relevant to the
aforementioned case is an exception regarding repetition created in Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission.49 In the Majority
opinion written by Justice McKenna, it is established that in cases where the
issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” the Federal Courts should
not dismiss the case on behalf of mootness.50 It is foreseeable that the
petitioners in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. would claim that their
grievances are “capable of repetition.”51 Originally, the City of New York
42

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937).
82 WASH. 2d 11, 23 n. 6, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1177 n. 6 (1973).
44
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244.
45
Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367 (1960).
46
North Carolina, op. cit., at 246.
47
38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-01(a), New York State statute, NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(a),
(b) (Consol. 2019).
48
N.Y.C. Charter § 1043(f)(1)(c)., App. 9a–10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(5), (6))., App. 10a
(38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-22(a)(16))., App. 8a–9a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3)).
49
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
50
Id, at 515.
51
Id.
43
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simply affirmed that it would no longer enforce the restrictions set out in Rule
5-23, the law in question here. Three months later, the NYPD released
amendments to Rule 5-23 to the public that would satisfy today’s petitioners
concerns. These amendments were adopted by the City. Additionally, as
previously mentioned, in June 2019, New York State changed its laws to
remove the transportation restrictions hindering the petitioners.52 “Before a
case will be dismissed as moot, the Court has imposed a burden on the
defendant to prove that there exists no reasonable expectation of
recurrence.”53 The changes in the City’s enforcement should be sufficient to
deem this case moot, however, the New York State law change is plenary to
cement its mootness and prove that there “exists no reasonable expectation
of recurrence.”54
B. Precedence for Assigning Mootness to Cases Experiencing Amendments
to Laws in Question Post-Certiorari.
Precedence supports why a change in law can deem a case moot. In
United States v. Alaska S.S. Co.,55 the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) mandated carriers to use a specific bill of lading: a receipt of goods
given from the carrier to the deliveryman that have been shipped. Carriers
complained that the ICC did not have the power to prescribe bills of lading.
The ICC appealed a district court ruling in favor of the ruling, but while the
ICC faced a temporary injunction from the district court, Congress passed the
Transportation Act of 1920. The Transportation Act of 1920 changed the way
the ICC issued bills of lading.56 Per the new Congressional legislation, the
Court found that “[w]here by an act of the parties, or a subsequent law, the
existing controversy has come to an end, the case becomes moot and should
be treated accordingly” and so, “in our view the proper course is to reverse
the order, and remand the cause to the court below with directions to dismiss
the petition.”57 In another gun restrictions case, United States Department of
Treasury v. Galioto,58 the plaintiff was barred from purchasing a firearm
because, 10 years prior, he was committed to a mental institution. 18 U.S.C.
prohibited the selling of a firearm to anyone committed to a mental
52

See App. 9a–10a (38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(5), (6)).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27.
54
Id.
55
See United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
56
Id, at 115.
57
Id, at 116.
58
See United States Department of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986).
53
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institution.59 The district court found numerous faults with portions of the law
and declared the statute unconstitutional. During the United States’ appeal,
the statute was amended so that it would allow any person previously
prohibited from buying a firearm, to apply for a license.60 In that case, the
Court unanimously agreed, as C.J. Burger wrote, “This enactment of the lawsignificantly alters the posture of this case.”61 C.J. Burger continues to
explain that the new legislation regarding 18 U.S.C.S. “affords an
administrative remedy to former mental patients like that Congress provided
for others prima facie [at first] ineligible to purchase firearms. Thus, it can
no longer be contended that such persons have been ‘singled out.’”62 Given
that the new legislation served as a remedy to Mr. Galioto’s concerns, the
Court “vacated the judgement” and “remand[ed] the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”63
Finally, even just last year, the current Court, prior to the confirmation of
Justice Kavanaugh, came to a unanimous agreement in United States v.
Microsoft.64 Here, Microsoft contended that a search warrant did not apply to
information (specifically emails) held overseas.65 There was, at one point, a
controversy between Microsoft and a Magistrate Judge over information held
abroad that was accessible through a warrant, however, “on March 23, 2018,
Congress enacted and the President signed into law the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act).”66 The CLOUD Act clarified that
a business such as Microsoft was obligated to, among other things, disclose
electronic communications “located within or outside of the United States.”67
After the CLOUD Act was passed, the Government obtained a new warrant
to access the information and the Court held that “no live dispute remains
between the parties over the issue with respect to which certiorari was
granted.”68 For those reasons:
This case[…] has become moot. Following the Court’s established practice in such
cases, the judgment on review is accordingly vacated, and the case is remanded to
59

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922, § 925.
United States Department of Treasury v. Galioto, op. cit., at 558.
61
Id, at 559.
62
Id.
63
Id, at 560.
64
United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. CT. 1186 (2018).
65
Justin A. Anderson, Lorin L. Reisner, Serrin Andrew Turner, In the Matter of a Warrant
to: Search a Certain E-Mail Account: Controlled and Maintained by: Microsoft
Corporation., 13-MAG-281415, F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
66
United States v. Microsoft, op. cit., at 1186, 1187.
67
CLOUD Act §103(a)(1).
68
United States v. Microsoft, op. cit., at 1188.
60
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions first to
vacate the District Court’s contempt finding and its denial of Microsoft’s motion to
quash, then to direct the District Court to dismiss the case as moot.69

Through precedence and unanimous support, it should be clear that when
new legislation is passed that directly eliminates the controversies held in a
specific case, that case becomes moot. Furthermore, it is not relevant to the
Court whether the law enacted was done so to avoid a ruling on the issue.
C. Mootness Irrespective of Intentions
Enacting a law for the purpose of avoiding a ruling is neither
objectionable nor relevant. The intentions behind legislation should play no
role in the Court’s assessment of a specific case’s justiciability. When a live
controversy ceases to exist, and the ruling of the Court would no longer
impact the injury complained of, the Court should and has deemed the case
moot. In Kremens v. Bartley,70 the Court looked at a case regarding hospital
regulations. Five plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
statute that regulated the admission of minors to a state mental health
institution simply because their parents placed them there, despite the minor’s
objection.71 After the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found the statute unconstitutional, Pennsylvania passed the
Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA). This reversed the statute and treated
minors, who were 13 years of age and older, as persons above 18 years of age
for purposes of admittance to a state mental health institution.72 Upon direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, given that there was no longer a controversy, a
majority of the Court found the issue moot, vacated the District Court’s
ruling, and remanded the case. Importantly, in Justice Rehnquist’s majority
opinion, he states, “the fact that the Act was passed after the decision below
does not save the named appellees' claims from mootness.”73 Similarly, in
Buckhannon Bd. & Care v. W. VA. Dep’t of Health Human Res.,74 petitioners
argued that a self-preservation clause in the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 were
unconstitutional. Then, “[i]n 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two
bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and respondents moved
to dismiss the case as moot. The District Court granted the motion, finding
69

Id.
See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
71
Id.
72
Id, at 125.
73
Id, at 119. See also: id, at 128.
74
See Buckhannon Bd. & Care v. W. VA. Dep’t of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598.
70
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that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions
and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would
repeal the amendments.”75 In today’s case, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association Inc. v. City of New York, it is true that legislation was passed after
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, the precedence in Kremens
and Buckhannon is clear: the timing of new legislation is irrelevant. The only
importance to mootness is if the issue at hand still exists and, given New
York’s new legislation that enables transportation of firearms to second
homes outside of city boundaries and shooting ranges outside of city
boundaries, the plaintiff’s alleged injuries are no longer existent and the case
should be moot.
IV. JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
In a world of ever-diversifying judicial philosophies, one understanding
seems uniform throughout the Justices: the limits of Article III judicial
powers. Every Justice recognizes that a case is only justiciable if it can be
categorized as a case or controversy. Mootness has remained an important
and significant restriction on the Judicial branch. However, the Justices’
common understanding of justiciability is not only apparent in their voting
records but also their judicial philosophies. In the Williams and Mary Law
Review, Alberto Gonzales, former counsel and U.S. Attorney General to
President Bush, outlined Chief Justice Roberts’ judicial jurisprudence.
Gonzales defined the four pillars of C.J. Roberts’ judicial philosophy: judicial
avoidance, judicial deference, narrow construction, and clarity. The first
sequential section of Robert’s ideology, judicial avoidance, states: if at all
possible, cases must be dismissed on grounds of standing, mootness or
ripeness. Never rush to make a decision unless necessary and avoid the
temptation to reinvent extant legal interpretations of law or precedent.”76 The
importance of mootness is recognized on both ends of the Court’s ideological
spectrum. In an Note on the Robert’s Court in the Akron Law Review, in
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, “Justice Thomas held that ‘the…
respondent's suit became moot when her individual claim became moot,
because she lacked any personal interest in representing others in this
action.’”77 In the same Note, it was noted that "a case becomes moot only
when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief to the prevailing
75

Id, at 601.
Alberto R. Gonzales, In Search of Justice: An Examination of the Appointments of John
G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court and Their Impact on American
Jurisprudence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 647, 693.
77
Andrew J. Trask, The Roberts Court and the End of the Entity Theory, 48 AKRON L.
REV. 831, 857.
76
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party."78 Furthermore, a former clerk for Alito recognized the ability to
“[moot] a statute with a subsequent statute."79 Even Justice Ginsburg, who
has been historically reluctant to resort to mootness on a case, recognized that
before the merits of a case are examined, the case must be justiciable. One of
her former law clerks wrote that “mootness was occasionally an obstacle to
her success on the merits.”80 In fact, “Justice Ginsburg asked the highest
percentages of Threshold, Precedent, and Fact questions… In Camreta, her
first question was a Threshold question about mootness: ‘Why would he face
liability?’”81 with her second question targeted on the merits. The order of
questions is relevant here because a case must be deemed live (not-moot)
before merits can be examined.
V. CONCLUSION
The New York Rifle and Pistol Association cited two injuries when they
chose to pursue a case against the City of New York: their inability to
transport guns to a shooting range outside of the City and their inability to
transport guns to a second house outside of the City. Since that initial case,
the State of New York has enacted a law that reverses both of those injuries.
Mootness is assigned to situations in which “concrete adverseness once
existed, but no longer does” in part because “concrete factual development
continues to be available to assist the Court”82 (i.e. a new law). The U.S.
Supreme Court understood mootness as, “the doctrine of standing set in a
time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness).”83 With a favorable decision, there would be no
tangible change to the petitioners, placing this case squarely within the
modern mootness doctrine. “The mootness doctrine addresses the problem of
abstract remedial orders, rather than the problem of abstract holdings, i.e.,
holdings not rooted in the concrete experience provided by the

78

Id, at 859.
Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1441, 1469.
80
Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 251, 291.
81
Cynthia Kelly Conlon and Julia M. Karaba, May It Please the Court: Questions About
Policy at Oral Argument, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 89, 108.
82
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case., 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 245.
83
Emily Tancer Broach, Post-Conviction Proceedings, Supervised Release, and a
Prudential Approach to the Mootness Doctrine, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493, 499.
79
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controversy.”84 When a controversy no longer exists, it becomes burdensome
to the Court to hear the case. There is a reason that the Court has created a set
of standards for a case to be deemed justiciable. The Court simply does not
have the time, nor constitutional authority, to hear cases with no controversy
that cannot be redressed by a favorable decision. Corey C. Watson
commented on Justices Scalia and O’Connor’s defense of the mootness
principle in their dissent in Honig v. Doe85 stating:
The dissent unequivocally declared that mootness is a doctrine anchored to our
Constitution with ‘deep roots in the common-law understanding, and hence the
constitutional understanding, of what makes a matter appropriate for judicial
disposition.’86

Mootness is caused when the Court finds “either (a) that the issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or (b) that the "'parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.'"87 It is clear that the issues in The New York State
Rifle Pistol Association, Inc., v. The City of New York are no longer live and
neither party holds a “cognizable interest in the outcome,” in which case, the
precedence, the opinions of legal experts, and the structure of the Constitution
all point to one simple remedy: declare the case moot.
***

84

David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context
for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 829.
85
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
86
See Corey C. Watson, Mootness and the Constitution, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 143, 144.
(quoting Honig v. Doe).
87
See id, at 148.
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